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Abstract 
 
Due to recent advances in synthetic biology and artificial life, the origin of life is 
currently a hot topic of research. We review the literature and argue that the two 
traditionally competing ‘replicator-first’ and ‘metabolism-first’ approaches are 
merging into one integrated theory of individuation and evolution. We contribute to 
the maturation of this more inclusive approach by highlighting some problematic 
assumptions that still lead to an impoverished conception of the phenomenon of life. 
In particular, we argue that the new consensus has so far failed to consider the 
relevance of intermediate timescales. We propose that an adequate theory of life must 
account for the fact that all living beings are situated in at least four distinct 
timescales, which are typically associated with metabolism, motility, development, 
and evolution. On this view, self-movement, adaptive behavior and morphological 
changes could have already been present at the origin of life. In order to illustrate this 
possibility we analyze a minimal model of life-like phenomena, namely of precarious, 
individuated, dissipative structures that can be found in simple reaction-diffusion 
systems. Based on our analysis we suggest that processes in intermediate timescales 
could have already been operative in prebiotic systems. They may have facilitated and 
constrained changes occurring in the faster- and slower-paced timescales of chemical 
self-individuation and evolution by natural selection, respectively.  
 
Keywords: origin of life; adaptive behavior; dissipative structure; replicator-first; 
metabolism-first; reaction-diffusion system; autopoiesis; life-mind continuity. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the field of artificial life and synthetic biology there is a widespread optimism that 
the creation of a living cell from scratch is imminent [14, 35, 98, 112]. Accordingly, it 
is hoped that these bio-engineering approaches will help to finally resolve one of the 
most important outstanding mysteries of science, namely the problem of the origin of 
life on earth. In this paper we highlight and criticize some unquestioned assumptions 
underlying these approaches, and offer some ideas on how to improve them. 
 
In the science of the origin of life there are two competing traditions, which are called 
‘replicator-first’ (a.k.a. ‘information-first) and ‘metabolism-first’, with the ‘replicator-
first’ scenario generally receiving most of the support [1, 74]. We briefly review the 
main tenets of these two traditions, and argue that they are beginning to merge into 
one mainstream consensus, which we call the ‘information-compartment-metabolism-
first’ approach to the origin of life. In essence, the consensus is that the crucial event 
in the first transition from non-living matter to a living being is the appearance of a 
bounded self-maintaining entity subject to evolution by natural selection. 
Researchers’ opinions mainly differ in terms of the nature of the heritable information 
of the first replicators, i.e. whether replication involved symbolic representations 
and/or metabolic structures. However, this is a difference in emphasis rather than an 
absolute distinction. No matter whether the first forms of life are hypothesized to have 
been based on strings of RNA code or self-maintaining vesicles, the underlying 
shared assumption can be summed up by the slogan that ‘life began when evolution 
began’ [101]. Accordingly, most research on the origin of life is focused on how best 
to simulate or chemically engineer the emergence of self-replicating structures that 
are capable of open-ended evolution [26, 77, 78, 94].  
 
The information-compartment-metabolism-first consensus is an integrated attempt to 
understand the requirements for evolvability, individuation, and self-organization, all 
of which are characteristic features of life [84, 85]. In this respect the consensus is to 
be welcomed over the more limited traditional perspectives of the replicator-first and 
metabolism-first approaches. Nevertheless, we argue that the current focus on spatial 
encapsulation in the service of both self-maintenance and natural selection remains an 
impoverished view of the phenomenon of life. Because the consensus only takes the 
two disparate timescales of chemical reactions and evolutionary history into account, 
it has failed to consider the relevance of the intermediate timescales of behavior and 
development. In other words, this approach completely neglects what is perhaps most 
characteristic of living beings in contrast to non-living things, namely self-generated 
translational and transformative movements in response to internal and environmental 
events. All living beings engage in interactive exchanges with their environment, 
including with other living beings, and they also modify their morphological structure 
over time. We propose that such activities in these intermediate timescales are not 
limited to more recently evolved forms of life; they may have already been operative 
at the very origin of life.  
 
In order to illustrate this idea we analyze a minimal simulation model of a simple 
class of dissipative structures, namely a reaction-diffusion system. We follow Virgo 
[107] in arguing that dissipative structures whose self-production is spatiotemporally 
localized, but not membrane-bound, have many important commonalities with living 
beings. They are therefore worthy of study in the context of the origin of life. The 
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model demonstrates that even very simple examples of such self-producing structures 
are capable of motility, adaptive behavior, structural modification, and epigenetic 
evolution. On the basis of these modeling results we conclude by speculating about 
the feasibility of a ‘movement-first’ approach to the origin of life. 
 
2. Current theories about the origin of life 
 
2.1 The replicator-first approach 
 
The replicator-first approach to the origin of life assumes that there was already a 
genetic code right at the start of life itself. An extreme version of this view is known 
as the ‘RNA world’, which holds that “the first stage of evolution proceeds […] by 
RNA molecules performing the catalytic activities necessary to assemble themselves 
from a nucleotide soup” [36, p. 618]. However, it is now being considered that this 
traditional RNA-only view is incomplete. Maynard-Smith was the first to argue that 
the evolution of a system of autocatalysts would be vulnerable to the emergence of 
parasitic side-reactions and would require an unlikely kind of group selection of all 
the individual chemical species [59]. He also suggested that both issues could be 
addressed by assuming that the chemical system was compartmentalized inside some 
kind of membrane. On this view, compartments turn what would otherwise be a 
cluttered ‘ecosystem’ of competing genes into a population of distinct genotypes, 
thereby satisfying a crucial tenet of the neo-Darwinian theory of evolution [45].  
 
The replicator-first approach has therefore turned toward the task of incorporating 
suitable information-encoding molecules into the right kind of vesicle in a way that 
ensures the accurate replication of both [35, 38, 88]. Of particular importance is to 
find a way of encapsulating the genetic code such that it satisfies another requirement 
of Darwinian evolution, namely competition and differential success [11, 12]. 
Although the growing emphasis on the need for an enclosing membrane at the origin 
of life brings this view closer to the metabolism-first approach, as we argue below, 
some differences remain. According to this replicator-first view, the role of 
metabolism for the origin of the first living cell is still mostly a secondary aspect, and 
it is occasionally absent from explicit consideration. On this view, the essence of life 
only consists of two complementary components: “fundamentally, a cell consists of a 
genome, which carries information, and a membrane, which separates the genome 
from the external environment” [11, p. 1558]. Thus, replicator-first theorists have 
come to generally accept the need for some kind of specialized self-individuation, 
even if it is often conceived like a passive container instead of an active membrane 
interface.  
 
Further revisions to the replicator-first approach are underway. There is a growing 
recognition among proponents of the RNA world hypothesis that metabolic cycles 
played an essential role at the origin of life [22]. Even replicators would need some 
kind of metabolic capability “that would enable thermodynamic impediments on 
replicative capability to be largely circumvented” [75, p. 728]. Furthermore, the same 
metabolic mechanisms by which thermodynamic equilibrium is avoided can serve as 
a source of functional variation on which natural selection can potentially operate so 
as to increase diversity and complexity [111], at least as long as the variations are 
heritable. For instance, the famous evolutionary experiments by Spiegelman and 
Orgel demonstrated that RNA replication just for replication’s sake, i.e. without any 
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other fitness criterion than replication, does not lead to an increase in complexity [68]. 
On the contrary, less complex (shorter) RNA chains replicate faster, so in the absence 
of any other useful functionality, the RNA was selected to become shorter and 
shorter. What these experiments demonstrate is that the origins of life and the start of 
diversification via evolution require more than only the traditionally assumed triad of 
multiplication, variation, and heredity. Individuals need to be metabolically organized 
in a way that allows for the expressions of a variety of functions at the level of the 
living system as a whole for natural selection to properly get off the ground [64, 86].  
 
Given these changes in emphasis it seems that the original replicator-first approach is 
developing into a more encompassing information-compartment-metabolism-first 
approach, where all the three molecular mechanisms are linked in an interdependent 
and heritable manner. An early example of this position is Ganti’s [34] ‘chemoton’ 
theory, but there are also a growing number of modern theories that specifically 
highlight such a threefold design [79, 94]. 
 
2.2 The metabolism-first approach  
 
Traditionally, the metabolism-first view has focused on more abstract issues regarding 
biological autonomy, self-organization, and self-production, such as Maturana and 
Varela’s [58] autopoietic theory, Kauffman’s [46] autocatalytic theory, and Rosen’s 
[82] metabolic-repair system theory. It was widely assumed that living is essentially a 
process of self-production, which constitutes a spatially localized individual. Since 
this view of life does not necessitate the existence of information represented in a 
genetic code, it seems that life must have initially arisen because of constraints that 
were imposed by self-organization rather than natural selection. Nevertheless, more 
recent versions of metabolism-first approaches are no longer that different from the 
information-compartment-metabolism-first approach described above. 
 
First, there is the idea of individuation, which is commonly inspired by the semi-
permeable membrane of a living cell and is therefore often identified with a distinct 
physical boundary. For instance, according to Luisi and Varela’s [53] interpretation of 
autopoietic theory, a self-producing network of autocatalytic chemical processes is 
not a sufficient condition for life, unless it is encapsulated within a physical boundary 
that enables the same processes which also produce the boundary itself. Similarly, 
modeling studies of autopoiesis tend to assume that a distinct physical boundary is 
necessary to prevent the network of processes from passively diffusing into the 
environment [10, 61, 105] and to regulate its molecular exchanges [8, 83]. On this 
view, the first living being was a bounded self-producing chemical system.  
 
Second, there are efforts to integrate the emphasis on biological autonomy with the 
historical-collective requirements of evolution by natural selection [23, 84]. Research 
in prebiotic chemistry has demonstrated that it is possible to engineer the emergence 
of membrane-bounded micelles that are self-maintaining and self-replicating [2, 70, 
109]. Radical proposals hold that natural selection is already operative at the chemical 
level, and that it can therefore guide the emergence of suitable autocatalytic systems 
[25, 46, 62]. On this view, heredity can be based on the chemical composition of the 
system itself, which serves as a ‘compositional genome’ [90]. Metabolism may also 
play a role in making novel functional variations available for selection [76]. 
Differential replicative success of the offspring is also ensured, because “Darwinian 
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competitive exclusion is rooted in the chemical competitive exclusion of metabolism” 
[65, p. 58]. Indeed, simulation models have demonstrated that under some conditions 
the growth and division of membrane-bounded autocatalytic systems is sufficient for 
differential replicative success [69, 71]. This form of epigenetic evolution does not 
fulfill all of the requirements of the replicator-first approach, specifically ‘unlimited 
heredity’ based on modular templates [97], but it does involve natural selection in the 
classic Darwinian sense of multiplication, variation, and heredity. 
 
As the evolutionary bottlenecks faced by protocells with composition-based genomes 
are clarified [106], there is a growing need for metabolism-first approaches to address 
the decoupling between phenotype and genotype that is realized in all extant living 
systems by means of a genetic code [86]. However, since genetic decoupling is not an 
all or nothing affair, with some molecules serving both functions, the metabolism-first 
view is on a continuum with the replicator-first approach. Both approaches can be 
integrated into one information-metabolism-compartment-first approach. 
 
2.3 Toward an information-compartment-metabolism-first approach 
 
The replicator-first and metabolism-first approaches to the origin of life have differed 
significantly in the past. However, due to recent advances they are no longer mutually 
exclusive. Both approaches generally agree that biological individuation requires a 
distinct physical compartment, even though they have different primary reasons for 
this claim (i.e. ‘unit of natural selection’ versus ‘unit of self-production’). Both also 
agree that survival is about maintaining an adequate metabolism, although again their 
emphasis is different (i.e. ‘self-replication’ versus ‘self-production’). In addition, they 
both acknowledge that the beginning of life was already shaped by natural selection, 
even though they disagree about the nature of the inherited information (i.e. ‘modular 
template’ or ‘compositional genome’). In other words, while there are still differences 
between the replicator-first and metabolism-first approaches, they are merging into an 
integrated information-compartment-metabolism-first approach. This consensus about 
the origin of life is centered on the integration of phenomena that are taking place at 
distinct temporal and spatial scales, namely the conservation of an individual in the 
chemical domain and the evolution of a population in the historical domain. 
 
3. Living is being, doing, developing, and evolving 
 3.1 Living	  is	  information-­‐processing?	  History	  repeats	  itself	  
 
Given this theoretical convergence of the two main traditions, and considering recent 
practical successes in implementing this new synthesis via synthetic biology [95], it 
may seem that the optimism pervading the field is well founded. The creation of all 
kinds of useful artificial life forms appears to be within our grasp, and the final 
mysteries of the origin and evolution of life on earth seem tantalizingly close to being 
resolved [35]. 
 
However, the confident promises of synthetic biology will sound all too familiar to 
those who know the history of ‘synthetic psychology’ – an approach better known as 
artificial intelligence (AI). Indeed, about half a century ago there was a similar 
optimism prevalent in the scientific community, stimulated by some early successes in 
robotics and machine learning, that the creation of artificial minds and conscious 
	   7	  
machines was just around the corner. Psychology, it was believed, was soon to be 
replaced by computer science. The driving force of that optimism, which in hindsight 
looks naïve and misguided, was a digital-information-centered theory of the mind that 
resonated with new advances in engineering and technology. Information technology 
has indeed turned out to be a great success in revolutionizing the industry, but the idea 
that cognitive science can be reduced to computer science is no longer in fashion. 
There are promising alternative theories of mind on offer, and it is clear that the role 
of symbolic AI will remain marginal [27]. On the contrary, the mind is essentially 
embodied, embedded, dynamical, and enactive [13, 28, 33, 102]. How ironic it is, 
then, that at the moment in which cognitive science is undergoing a major theoretical 
makeover toward a theory of the mind that is grounded in the whole organism [102], 
the science of life is at the same time extoling the virtues of trying to reduce the 
complexities of cellular biology to the level of ‘logic circuits’ [67] and ‘computer 
programming’ [3]. The history of science, it seems, is about to repeat itself. The 
reduction of biological life to computational logic is clearly not as straightforward as 
some recent advances in biotechnology may seem to indicate [29].  	  
In particular, we note that, in a significant sense, the life as lived by the individual 
organism is still completely absent from the new consensus about the origin of life 
that we outlined above. On the one hand there is structural self-maintenance, and on 
the other hand there is informational self-replication. However, we know the former 
phenomenon from the general class of dissipative structures, and the latter 
phenomenon from the case of computer viruses – and neither of these two phenomena 
is typically considered as being alive. It is hoped that combining these two non-living 
phenomena will create a bridge to living phenomena, but we argue that this hope is 
likely unjustified unless the behavioral and developmental time scales are also taken 
into account. What the synthetic products of the information-compartment-
metabolism-first approach are currently missing is the autonomous expression of 
goal-directed changes at the level of the individual organism as a whole. There is a 
complete lack of concern with the role of translational movement and 
transformational change, which could be studied in terms of traditional fields of 
biology including ethology and developmental biology.2  
 3.2 The	  timescales	  of	  life:	  Metabolism,	  behavior,	  development,	  and	  evolution	  
 
We propose that all of these aspects of life, i.e. metabolism, behavior, development, 
and evolution, form one unified phenomenon. Each of these processes, no matter its 
spatiotemporal scale, is integrated into one process of open-ended becoming. On this 
view, the possibility of distinguishing between them is simply due to the fact that they 
are expressed in terms of different timescales. Separating out one or more timescales 
to the exclusion of the others, e.g. historical change for the replicator-first approach or 
chemical rates for the metabolism-first approach, results in an impoverished and 
ultimately inadequate characterization of life. All known living beings are embedded 
within four broad interlinked categories of change: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Although we do not focus on the role of morphology and ecology in this discussion, they are clearly 
important topics of future research. For example, in related studies it has been found that morphology 
is linked to self-motility in a model of autopoiesis [96] and environmental negative feedback is linked 
to self-individuation in a model of a reaction-diffusion system [107, Chapter 5.4]. 	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Being: Metabolic events on this smallest timescale are taking place continuously in 
the physical and chemical domain of the organism. They are foundational in that they 
realize the concrete, spatiotemporally localized, existence of the individual living 
being in an autonomous manner via self-production [5].  
 
Doing: Behaviors in this first intermediate timescale are unfolding in the relational 
domain of organism-environment interaction. The relational changes can be more or 
less tightly coupled to internal metabolic changes [18], but they are a non-reducible 
emergent property of the interaction process that cannot be conceptualized non-
relationally. 
 
Developing: Ontogenetic events on this second intermediate timescale are involved in 
making an individual become a structurally qualitatively different kind of individual 
within its own lifetime. Examples include some forms of learning, such as changes in 
neural connectivity, and morphogenesis. 
 
Evolving: structurally qualitative changes in the historical lineage of generations of 
individuals take place on the longest timescales. Examples are code-based genetic, 
compositional genetic, and epigenetic forms of evolution that are shaped by natural 
selection, sexual selection, and/or natural drift.  
 
Of course, the differentiation of the changes exhibited by living beings into these four 
distinct timescales should not be misunderstood in any absolute sense. Our starting 
point is to treat life as a unified phenomenon, and these distinctions do not reflect 
strict boundaries between the distinct timescales of becoming. While each of these 
timescales can be addressed in relative isolation, as demonstrated by their respective 
fields of study: biochemistry, ethology, developmental biology, and evolutionary 
biology, a complete understanding of life must be able to show how these different 
aspects are expressions of one and the same unified phenomenon3. They are mutually 
interdependent and yet non-reducible. We suggest that one way of moving biological 
theory forward is by introducing some intermediate timescales, namely behavior and 
development, into the current debates surrounding the origin of life. We need to 
consider that in the case of all extant living beings the ‘self’ referred to by the notions 
of self-maintenance and self-replication is a center of activity, i.e. an agent [85].  
 3.3 Toward	  a	  movement-­‐first	  approach	  to	  the	  origin	  of	  life	  
 
It may be that the most minimal form of life that satisfies all of our timescale criteria 
would actually have to be a membrane-bound single-celled organism that is capable 
of code-based genetic evolution by means of natural selection. However, in what 
follows we will try to loosen some assumptions of the information-compartment-
metabolism-first consensus in order to see how much can be achieved even with much 
simpler systems. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 There is an interesting analogy with robotics here, which has addressed behavior, some development, 
and evolution, but has so far failed to incorporate metabolism. Several significant AI problems arise 
from this specific shortcoming [32]. Similarly, the information-compartment-metabolism-first theory 
has addressed metabolism and evolution, but so far has failed to account for behavior and development. 
We therefore expect related problems to become apparent. 
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To begin with, we side with the metabolism-first approach in questioning the need for 
a genetic representational code at the origin of life. Relaxing the assumption of such a 
specialized information system seems reasonable. For instance, it has been argued that 
the ‘RNA world’ hypothesis faces considerable difficulties when confronted with 
realistic constraints of prebiotic Earth [92]. A promising alternative is to reject the 
requirement of a code-based genetic system at the beginning of evolution by natural 
selection. It is possible that genetic representation may not have been present at the 
origin of life, but appeared during later stages. For example, following the work of 
Segré, Lancet and colleagues [89-91], a protocell’s chemical composition can itself 
serve as a ‘compositional genome’, which remains relatively well preserved during 
protocell division. Alternatively, it is possible that the composition’s heredity is 
achieved through multiple attractors in the autocatalytic reaction network's dynamics 
[25]. Our argument is sympathetic with these non-representational approaches to the 
origin of heredity, but it is not dependent on them. 
 
In addition, as discussed above, nowadays it is customary for both replicator-first and 
metabolism-first approaches to assume the existence of a physical boundary that 
protects either the RNA or the composition of the chemical mixture from adverse 
environmental influences, e.g. by assuming a lipid vesicle [54]. For instance, when 
this requirement of a boundary is combined with the idea of a compositional genome, 
we end up with the ‘Lipid world’ scenario of the origin of life [89]. However, by 
enclosing the RNA or other autocatalytic network in a relatively inert semipermeable 
membrane, which is often conceived as originating through external processes [15], 
these approaches are implicitly committed to the idea that the origin of life gave rise 
to behaviorally passive entities. It has been suggested that the preferential association 
of an ensemble of compounds “could be achieved by passive compartmentalization on 
the surface of fine particulate matter, within aerosol particles in the atmosphere, or 
within the pores of a rock” [45, p. 219]. And yet all of life as we know it today 
depends on an active process of organism-environment interaction and its adaptive 
regulation [5, 16, 63]. Far from serving merely as a static compartment, the 
membrane boundary around every living being is better conceived of as an active 
interface that is essential for behavior generation [8, 39]. It is precisely by means of 
this self-other interface that a cell regulates its metabolism and behavior through 
chemical and sensorimotor pathways.  
 
The contrast between a static compartment and an active interface leaves us with two 
possibilities. On the one hand, we can continue to assume that life originally began 
enclosed in a static compartment and try to explain how this boundary later developed 
into an active interface. This idea derives from a long tradition of research [100], and 
it is still an integral part of the information-compartment-metabolism-first consensus. 
The challenge for this view is to solve the ‘permeability problem’ [15, 55]: how could 
chemicals be selectively exchanged across the compartment without the help of 
cellular proteins specialized for molecular transport? In modern cells, the membrane 
is covered with active pumps. Solving this problem was essential for cellular life 
because without an inflow of nutrients the cell will starve, without an outflow of 
waste it will poison itself, and without regulation of chemical concentrations an 
osmotic burst can rupture the compartment. 
 
On the other hand, we can place priority on an active interface and adaptive behavior, 
and therefore relax the widespread assumption that a static compartment is needed for 
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the first step in biological organization. It may seem that only a physical compartment 
can ensure the individuality of a living being as an entity that is distinct from its 
environment, but we argue that this is not necessarily the case. Even modern cells are 
quite porous when observed at the level of membrane pumps. What really matters is 
the operational coherence or closure of the living system as a whole. And although 
this operational closure may be enhanced through a self-produced physical boundary, 
such a spatial boundary by itself should not be confused with the organizational limits 
of the living system as one integrated system [108]. For example, in some origin of 
life scenarios, chemical interactions are sufficient for the self-maintenance of a 
coherent systemic identity [45]. As we will argue below, chemical gradients can serve 
this purpose, too. To be sure, such a flexible ‘boundary’ can make it more challenging 
for an individual to survive in unfavorable environmental conditions. However, it is 
also the case that some adverse effects of this vulnerability, both on the level of the 
individual and of the population, can be mitigated by benefits on the individual-level 
such as rapid multiplication and, especially, motility, adaptive behavior, and directed 
exploration – a possibility that has not yet been sufficiently considered. On this view, 
there is the possibility that compartments arose through a process of self-
compartmentalization that was driven by interactive requirements.  
 
The idea of motility at the origin of life appears to be far removed from the current 
concerns of the information-compartment-metabolism-first consensus. Nevertheless, 
as we will argue in the next section, it relates to several topical issues in relevant 
ways. Furthermore, it can draw philosophical support from an ongoing reevaluation of 
movement in the phenomenology of life [6, 93]. And, most importantly, we also know 
from existing artificial life research that some life-like behaviors can already be found 
in protocells and even in simple prebiotic chemistry. For instance, it has been shown 
that metabolic self-production can easily lead to spontaneous movement as well as 
adaptive gradient following, i.e. chemotaxis, in minimal models of protocells [18, 96]. 
This synergy between behavior and metabolism also plays an essential role for longer 
timescales; agent-based models of protocell evolution have shown that metabolism-
based behavior can facilitate and guide evolution in several ways [19]. It has also 
been demonstrated that some of the chemicals typically favored for the synthesis of 
artificial protocells can spontaneously form oil droplets that exhibit self-sustained 
motility and a type of chemotaxis [37, 40, 103]. Accordingly, there have been calls for 
a new field of study in artificial life, variously labeled as ‘homeodynamics’ [42], 
‘chemo-ethology’ [20], and ‘chemical cognition’ [39]. In the specific context of the 
science of the origin of life, we propose to call this newly developing perspective a 
movement-first approach.  
 
In the following section we build on our previous models [29, 31, 107] in order to 
illustrate some of the issues related to a movement-first approach. The upshot is that, 
at least in evolutionary terms, it does not matter if compartmentless individuals are 
more prone to die from adverse changes in environmental conditions, as long as they 
are able to replicate quickly and move to different areas fast enough. It may therefore 
be the case that the evolution of a solid self-boundary was a secondary achievement 
that had to be balanced with the requirements of maintaining an active interface. Here 
we also see the importance of including a consideration of the intermediate timescales 
in which behavior takes place. Effectively, the population must be sufficiently 
distributed in its environment such that some of the individuals escape localized 
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extinction events, but this distribution is most reliably achieved by self-movement of 
the individuals.  
 
It is therefore conceivable that an early capacity for adaptive self-motility was already 
present at the origin of life. The model described in the next section is intended as a 
minimal proof of concept of this possibility. We emphasize that the aim of this model 
is not to provide a realistic simulation of prebiotic chemical conditions, nor do we 
claim that we have succeeded in modeling an actual living system. Rather, the aim is 
to advance our understanding of life by taking a closer look at the life-like properties 
of some of the ‘transients’ that exist somewhere between the inert and the living [24]. 
 
4. Toward a minimal model of the ‘movement-first’ approach 
 4.1 Precarious,	  individuated	  dissipative	  structures	  
 
Virgo [107] has argued that many of the properties of living organisms are shared by 
simple dissipative structures of the kind that form in reaction-diffusion systems. We 
review his reasoning below. Prigogine [73] coined the phrase ‘dissipative structure’ to 
denote a structure within a physical system that is actively maintained by a flow of 
energy and/or matter, rather than being an inert structure that is merely resistant to 
decay. Prigogine observed that living organisms are dissipative structures in this 
sense; however there are many other examples.  
 
Given what has been argued in the previous section, a suitable starting point for our 
model of the movement-first approach to the origin of life would be a self-sustaining 
chemical processes that is a spatiotemporally coherent individual, and yet is non-
compartmentalized. These criteria are met by a special class of dissipative structures, 
which Virgo ([107], Chap. 5) has called precarious, individuated dissipative 
structures. The class of living beings belongs to this class of structures. First, in 
addition to being a kind of dissipative structure, organisms have the property of being 
precarious, in the sense that if their structure is sufficiently disrupted it will stop 
being maintained (i.e. death). This emphasis on the precarious nature of the living 
goes against the popular idea that life is essentially about stability. The aim of 
stability would imply that the immortality enjoyed by non-living matter would be the 
ultimate yet unattainable goal of life. Instead, the process of living is better described 
as a transient with an end that can be postponed but not altogether avoided. Second, 
organisms are individuated, in the sense that they are spatiotemporally localized, and 
this localization is a result of the processes that make up the organism, rather than 
being imposed from outside. The notion that a living being is a precarious, 
individuated dissipative structure aligns our position with organism-centered 
approaches in biology and cognitive science, which are sometimes called ‘enactive’ 
(see also [4, 16, 17, 30, 43, 110]).  
 
Virgo has pointed out that certain other dissipative structures share these properties 
with living organisms. One non-living example of this type is a hurricane [60]. It is 
dissipative in that it ‘feeds’ off a temperature gradient between the sea surface in the 
upper atmosphere; it is precarious in that if an important component is removed it can 
blow out (as will eventually occur if it passes over land); and it is individuated in that 
it is the cause of its own spatial localization. Of course, not all dissipative structures 
are precarious or individuated, and not all precarious, individuated dissipative 
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structures share all properties of living systems. Nevertheless, studying this class of 
life-like structures provides a useful methodology for modeling some of life’s basic 
properties, especially if they exhibit self-organized behavior [39, 107]. 
 4.2 The	  Gray-­‐Scott	  reaction-­‐diffusion	  system	  
 
A simple and easy-to-study system that exhibits precarious, individuated dissipative 
structures is the Gray-Scott reaction-diffusion system, which was first studied in a 
two-dimensional context by Pearson [72]. This is a minimal model of chemical 
reactions taking place on a surface. The reaction modeled is a simple autocatalytic 
one, A + 2B è 3B, meaning that when two molecules of B collide with one of A, they 
react to produce a third molecule of B while using up one A in the process. A second 
reaction, B è P, represents the decay of the autocatalyst into an inert product that 
instantly leaves the system. The molecules A and B have a separate concentration at 
each point on a 2-D surface, represented by a and b (the concentration of P is not 
modeled). In addition, the ‘food’ molecule A is fed into every point at a rate 
proportional to 1 - a. This can be thought of as due to the surface being immersed in a 
solution of A at a constant concentration of 1. 
 
Finally, in addition to reacting and being added to the system, the two chemical 
species can diffuse across the surface. Overall this gives rise to Equations 1 and 2 
 !"!" = !!∇!! − !!! + !(1− !)     (1) !"!" = !!∇!! + !!! − !"      (2) 
 
where concentrations a and b are functions of space as well as time, r and k are 
parameters determined by the rates of the two reactions and the feed process (the rate 
of the autocatalytic reaction has been set to 1 without loss of generality), and DA and 
DB are the rates at which the species diffuse across the surface. These equations can 
be solved numerically using a method that is akin to a cellular automaton, except that 
each cell contains a continually variable amount of the two chemical species. 
 
Pearson observed that, depending on the choice of initial parameters, this system can 
form a variety of patterns, some of which are shown in Figure 1. Of particular interest 
are the spot patterns in Figure 1(f) and 1(g), since the spots have the properties of 
being individuated and precarious [107]. 
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Figure 1: Examples showing the range of patterns exhibited by the Gray-Scott reaction-diffusion 
system with various parameters (DA = 2x10-5 and DB = 10-5 in each). The integration method and initial 
conditions are similar to those used by Pearson [72]. Patterns are chosen as exemplars of various 
phenomena; see Pearson [72] for a more systematic classification. (a) a spiral pattern; (b) a chaotic 
pattern of travelling waves; (c) a line pattern, whereby lines grow at the ends and then bend to fill space 
in a process reminiscent of a river meandering; (d) a labyrinth pattern; (e) a hole pattern; (f) a pattern of 
unstable spots, whose overall population is maintained by a balance between reproduction and natural 
disintegration; (g) A stable spot pattern, whereby spots reproduce to fill empty space and then slowly 
migrate into the more-or-less organized pattern shown (with a different choice of parameters, spots can 
be produced that are stable but cannot reproduce). (Figure taken from Virgo [107], p. 85) 
 
We also know that many kinds of dissipative structures that are formed by reaction-
diffusion systems are capable of sustained movement and even self-replication. This 
kind of self-organized motility has been investigated experimentally [50-52] as well 
as modeled mathematically [48, 72, 104]. The dynamics of self-replicating reaction-
diffusion patterns have also been studied [80, 81]. In the dissipative structures of the 
Gray-Scott model we find cases of motility and replication as well, and this includes 
some kinds of individuated spots. We thus have all the basic requirements to begin 
our investigation of these ‘spots’ as a potential minimal model of the movement-first 
approach to life. We are particularly interested in whether the activity of this kind of 
reaction-diffusion system can be interpreted as taking place on the four timescales of 
metabolism, behavior, development, and evolution. 
 
4.3 Metabolism 
 
A reaction-diffusion spot can spontaneously emerge under appropriate conditions, and 
once it exists, it can self-maintain its precarious existence by means of a continuous 
turnover of chemical reactions (Fig. 2). As a self-producing network of chemical 
processes it satisfies the requirements of the first timescale of metabolism. It also 
provides the reference point of a spatiotemporal entity against which changes in other, 
slower timescales can be measured. 
(a) r=0.01k=0.05 (b)
r=0.011
k=0.045 (c)
r=0.05
k=0.115 (d)
r=0.04
k=0.1
(e) r=0.03k=0.085 (f)
r=0.02
k=0.078 (g)
r=0.04
k=0.105
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Figure 2: Concentration profile of a ‘spot’; a precarious, individuated dissipative structure found in the 
Gray-Scott reaction-diffusion system. For clarity of display a one-dimensional version of the system is 
shown. The spatially individuated structure of the spot remains constant over time due to a precarious 
balance between reaction and diffusion processes. The arrows indicate the direction in which processes 
occur. For example, near the center of the spot, B is continually produced by the autocatalytic reaction 
(upward arrow in the middle), but its concentration there remains constant due to the diffusive transport 
of B towards the sides of the spot (angled arrows). This diffusion is in turn is balanced by the tendency 
for the autocatalyst to decay away in the regions where its concentration is low, i.e. outside the center 
of the spot (downward arrows). (Figure taken from Virgo [107], p. 86) 
 
It is interesting to note in this regard that the spatiotemporal boundaries of a spot are 
intrinsically fuzzy. There is no distinct physical boundary. It is just as impossible to 
pinpoint the precise moment in time when the spot begins or ceases to exist, as the 
precise point in space where the spot ends and the environment begins. This is 
because the spot is a self-organizing phenomenon that is both continuous in time 
(temporal ambiguity) and continuous in space (spatial ambiguity). Nevertheless, at 
least an intuitive grasp of what constitutes an individual spot is possible; we either see 
an individual spot on the surface or we do not. The same fuzziness applies to the case 
of a living organism; for example, at the chemical level there is an inherent ambiguity 
of when and where a given molecule becomes a part of the organism. Similarly, it is 
possible that prebiotic compartments were very leaky, too [15]. This fuzziness is an 
advantage of the current model over other models that arbitrarily impose an absolute 
distinction between the inside and outside of a living system. 
 
Once an individual spot has spontaneously formed, it will continue to exist even when 
it encounters a limited range of conditions that would not have enabled its original 
emergence. The fact that spots can exist outside of their original range of emergence 
is an indication that they are actively reproducing the viability conditions required for 
their existence, which is a strong criterion for autopoietic autonomy [30]. It shows 
that the complex system as a whole is more than a linear combination of its isolated 
parts by placing top-down constraints on the level of its components. Indeed, it is no 
different in the case of actual living beings: although the origin of life must have 
taken place in environmental conditions that favored the spontaneous emergence of 
one or more living beings, later living beings have had to actively contribute to the 
maintenance of their own conditions of existence in order to persist. However, living 
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beings are different from other dissipative structures in that they adaptively regulate 
the self-maintenance of their conditions of viability, for example via behavior [7]. 
 
4.4 Behavior 
 
For the purpose of this paper we define the concept of behavior broadly as a process 
in the relational individual-environment domain. The start of a behavior is induced by 
an instability or tension in that relationship, and a behavior ceases when that tension is 
resolved or transformed into a different kind of tension, which elicits a different kind 
of behavior [17]. We take the view that all behavior is characterized by an essential 
agent-environment asymmetry, which is centered on the self-producing activity of the 
individual [4]. The tension that triggers a behavior may originate in the environment, 
but the fact that there can be such a tension at all is an achievement of the self-
constitution of the individual, which brings about the relational domain in the first 
place. In this sense the metabolic activity of the individual is the ultimate source of all 
its behavior, and this behavior arguably acquires its meaning for the point of view of 
the individual via this direct metabolic grounding [32].  
 
The general term ‘behavior’ covers a huge variety of changes in all kinds of entity-
environment relations, so some distinctions are in order. One important distinction in 
biology and psychology is between reactive behavior, namely behavior that is directly 
triggered by events in the environment, and what we call intrinsic behavior, namely 
behavior that is spontaneously performed by the individual. In what follows we are 
particularly interested in intrinsic movement, i.e. self-movement, but the distinction 
between reactive and intrinsic is not an absolute one. On the one hand, all biological 
systems have internal state and their ‘reactive’ behavior is therefore always also a 
function of their history, and, on the other hand, expression of intrinsically generated 
behavior always takes place within the context of external conditions and events. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to consider that a behavior can be more or less driven by 
internal and external factors. This is true for living beings and also, we argue, for the 
reaction-diffusion spots.  
 
To be clear, we are not claiming that the behavior of spots shares the same underlying 
mechanisms with the behavior of living beings. While the former kind of behavior is a 
side-product of metabolic activity, the latter is based on specialized and metabolically 
semi-detached regulatory processes [5], although metabolism-dependent behaviors 
may be present in some single-cell organisms [18]. In any case, even if the behavior 
of the reaction-diffusion spots does not satisfy strict organizational criteria for 
autonomous behavior or agency, for instance because the internal processes do not 
exhibit differentiated functions [66], it is important for the science of the origin of life 
to acknowledge that behaviors can be generated even by proto-life systems using 
much simpler mechanisms. 
 
Reactive behavior. The spots exhibit a clear type of reactive behavior with respect to 
differences in chemical gradients in their surroundings. We can describe this behavior 
in the biological terms of approach and avoidance: the spots are capable of following 
chemical gradients that increase the concentration of their constituents, which is akin 
to bacterial chemotaxis, and they are also capable of avoiding chemical gradients that 
decrease the concentration of their constituents. This gradient-based movement is a 
minimal example of metabolism-dependent behavior, which provides the spots with a 
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basic capacity to adapt to environmental changes. For example, we can attract the 
spots by ‘feeding’ them, i.e. by using a ‘virtual pipette’ to add constituents into their 
vicinity. If we feed too much food to a spot, then it will divide and form two spots. On 
the other hand, when we remove constituents from a nearby spot by using the pipette, 
the spot will tend to move away from the pipette. In this way it is possible to chase 
spots around the simulated surface. If the pipette is too fast and gets too close to a 
spot, it destabilizes the metabolic activity of the spot in such a way that the spot is no 
longer sustainable and dies. 
 
If there are several spots in the environment, then these approach and avoidance 
behaviors will make them interact in certain ways. This is because a spot consumes 
the food in its proximity, thereby surrounding itself with a negative gradient that 
keeps other spots away. If the spots did not tend to move away from one another then 
they would merge rather than remaining separate; these approach and avoidance 
behaviors therefore form an important part of the individuation process.  
 
Again, it is important to note that although these behaviors are reactive in the sense 
that they only occur in the presence of an appropriate environmental trigger, they are 
not reactive like the responses of a stateless system. On the contrary, they are the 
result of a continually active growth process. The spot moves in an adaptive manner 
because the autocatalyst grows faster on the side where the food concentration is 
higher. Therefore, even though these behaviors appear as reactive in the behavioral 
domain, they are nevertheless, like all behaviors, active in the metabolic domain.  
 
Intrinsic behavior. However, in order for the spot to move around spontaneously, i.e. 
even in the absence of environmental triggers, it must create its own instabilities that 
trigger the appropriate responses. Of course, because it is a dissipative structure, the 
spot as a whole is already in a far-from-equilibrium state. But since the instability that 
is produced by the reaction-diffusion system is symmetrical in all directions, the spot 
remains stationary without any environmental gradients. Accordingly, a self-moving 
spot requires a means of self-producing an asymmetrical distribution in the domain of 
individual-environment relationships. For example, in the case of a self-propelling oil-
droplet, symmetry breaking related to the expulsion of waste products was found to be 
essential for the generation of movement [37].  
 
We modified the model of the Gray-Scott reaction-diffusion system by implementing 
the concentration of the waste product P. We tested a number of parameter settings 
for achieving a similar kind of spontaneous motility for the spots. To do this we 
replaced Equations 1 and 2 with the following set of Equations 3-5: 
 !"!" = !!∇!! − !!!"!!! + !(1− !)    (3) !"!" = !!∇!! + !!!"!!! − !"    (4) !"!" = !" − !!!      (5) 
 
A new equation has been added to the reaction-diffusion system, modeling the spatial 
distribution of P. The component P is created when B decays, and P itself decays at a 
very slow rate (we use kp = 0.0002). The concentration of P modulates the kinetics of 
the A + 2B è 3B reaction: its forward reaction rate is now given by e-wp, so that a 
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buildup of P at a particular point will inhibit the autocatalysis of B. Figure 3 shows an 
example of the dynamics of this new system, with the parameters w = 0.015, r = 0.032 
and k = 0.0942, integrated with a time step of 0.5 units.  
 
         
 
(a) t = 1500  (b) t = 27000   (c) t = 35000 
 
Figure 3: A snapshot of the dynamics of the system defined by Equations 3-5. With this version of the 
equations the spots create a build-up of waste product that is detrimental to them, and this causes them 
to move away from it, leaving a trail behind them. The colors have been adjusted so that the spots of 
autocatalyst B appear black, whereas the waste product P appears as a lighter shade of gray. (a) The 
system is seeded with an initial square of autocatalyst; the figure shows the system shortly afterwards. 
The initial conditions must be chosen so that the autocatalyst does not immediately use up all the 
nearby nutrients, because the spot would then decay toward death. But the conditions can otherwise be 
chosen arbitrarily, since they make little difference to the final behavior. (b) Note that the spot towards 
the upper right has followed a spiral path, accidentally blocking itself into an area with a high waste 
concentration. Shortly after this (within 1000 time units) it ceased to persist; the concentration of the 
autocatalyst dropped below the threshold needed for self-maintenance and the spot disappeared. (c) 
More spots have appeared again. The overall dynamics of this system are complex, with the size of the 
population of spots tending to oscillate as the overall amount of waste in the system builds up and then 
slowly decays. 
 
The inhibitive effect of waste P causes the spots’ overall movement, as long as there 
is an asymmetrical distribution of P around the autocatalyst. If there is a gradient of P 
across a spot, then the growth rate of B will be higher on the side that has less P. This 
causes movement over time, as the side with less growth (due to more P) dies away 
more rapidly, thereby producing more P. As the spot moves it leaves a trail of P 
behind it, which in turn maintains the concentration gradient of P across the spot.  
 
It could be argued that the waste-driven movement is still more externally driven than 
internally driven. However, there is another way of achieving spontaneous motion of 
the spots. This is achieved by modifying the original Gray-Scott reaction-diffusion 
system by introducing a second autocatalyst to the system, which feeds not on the 
‘food’ molecule but on the other autocatalyst [107]. That is, the reactions B + 2C è 
3C and C è P are added to the system, so that Equations 1 and 2 are extended to 
Equations 6-8, where DC is the rate of diffusion of C, and k1, k2 and k3 are the rate 
constants for the reactions B è P, B + 2C è 3C and C è P, respectively.  
 !"!" = !!∇!! − !!! + !(1− !)    (6) !"!" = !!∇!! + !!! − !!! − !!!!!     (7) !"!" = !!∇!! + !!!!! − !!!      (8) 
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With an appropriate choice of parameters, the effect of this modification is to produce 
the usual spots of primary autocatalyst, but this time accompanied by a small region 
of the secondary autocatalyst. Since the secondary autocatalyst feeds on the primary 
one, the spot of primary autocatalyst tends to avoid it by moving away, while the 
secondary spot follows. This gives the secondary autocatalyst the appearance of being 
attached as a ‘tail’ behind the primary spot (Figure 4). The spot-tail system as a whole 
moves around spontaneously even in a homogeneous environment. In the sense that 
this self-motility depends on the internal constitution of the whole spot-tail system 
itself, we can characterize it as a form of intrinsic, non-reactive behavior. Related 
work has also found the emergence of spatial patterns with movement and dynamics 
of their own, for example spiral waves [41]. This model is different in that it shows 
the emergence of spatially distinct individuals that are self-moving. 
 
 
Figure 4: Two snapshots of the system resulting from Equations 6-8, integrated on a surface of 2 by 2 
units, with the parameters DA = 2x10-5, DB = 10-5, DC = 10-6, r = 0.0347, k1 = 0.2, k2 =0.8 and k3 = 
0.005. The colors are adjusted so that the secondary autocatalyst C appears as a darker shade of gray 
than the primary autocatalyst B. A group of spots with tails can be seen on the mid-left side of plot (a), 
and after duplication in plot (b) in the same place. Some tail-less spots can be seen as well, their tails 
having been lost in the process (hence, this is limited heredity with variation). The spots with tails 
move constantly in the direction facing away from their tails at a rate of approximately 4x10-4 distance 
units per time unit, which results in their colonizing the empty part of space more rapidly than the tail-
less spots. However, with this choice of parameters, the tailed spots cannot invade areas occupied by 
tail-less spots, and they are eventually crowded out and become extinct. (Figure taken from Virgo 
[107], p. 105). 
 
Although the spot-tail system is not strictly speaking an autocatalytic ‘hypercycle’ 
[21], because the direct chemical dependency between the two catalysts is not mutual, 
it nevertheless can be considered as ‘symbiotic’ to some extent [29, 49]. More 
specifically, although the tail is parasitic on the primary spot (since it contributes 
nothing to it metabolically), their jointly induced movements in the system-
environment domain can be adaptive in some environments. For instance, with certain 
parameter settings of the simulation, the spot-tail systems can reproduce more rapidly 
than the spots without tails, and their movement also tends to make them colonize 
new areas more rapidly. Given the selective advantage introduced by the behavior of 
the system as a whole, we have elsewhere introduced the notion of a ‘behavior-based 
hypercycle’ [29]. Figure 5 shows an example of a scenario where, over longer 
(a) t = 9060 (b) t = 9949
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timescales, spot-tail systems are better adapted than tail-less spots. This is due to the 
‘parasite’-enabled exploratory behavior, which helps to prevent localized extinction 
events from killing the whole population.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: A snapshot from the same system shown in Figure 4, with the same parameters, except that 
randomly chosen areas in the right-hand side of the surface are occasionally cleared by an externally 
induced cataclysm (i.e. the food concentration in a random 0.5-by-0.5 area is set to zero every 1000 
time units). The spots with tails are able to persist in this right-hand side due to their ability to colonize 
the cleared areas more rapidly than the spots without tails. But in the left-hand side of the figure they 
are out-competed. (Figure taken from Virgo [107], p. 105) 
 
The replicator-first approach to the origin of life claims that parasitic reactions are a 
significant problem for the metabolism-first approach, because of their unavoidable 
detrimental metabolic effects (and hence, another reason for the necessity of a 
compartment [99]). Positive effects of parasites have not been considered so far [29]. 
Although it has been previously observed that the addition of a parasite can induce 
spatial self-structuring [87], most research has focused on how to mitigate or even 
expel parasites altogether [9]. It may seem that symbiosis with parasites is dependent 
on their direct chemical contribution [47]. However, as our reaction-diffusion model 
has demonstrated, this is not always necessarily the case, especially considering the 
role of events taking place at intermediate timescales [29]. The important point is that 
what may be viewed as detrimental on the metabolic timescale (i.e. a ‘parasitic’ 
reaction) can induce novelty on the behavioral timescale (i.e. self-motility), which 
then turns out to be adaptive on the evolutionary timescale (i.e. faster replication and 
wider population distribution). Accordingly, given that most chemical studies of the 
origin of life completely ignore the possibility of behavioral effects at the system level 
having a differential effect for natural selection, they may be missing essential aspects 
of the phenomenon. 
 
The model of the spot-tail system is important in another respect. Several researchers 
have emphasized that simple dissipative structures are not suitable starting points for 
understanding the origin of life, in particular because such structures generally lack 
distinct functions based on organizational differentiation [64, 66, 86]. It appears that 
all local processes of simple dissipative structures are subsumed under the single 
intrinsic goal of global self-maintenance. In other words, “it is an ‘all or nothing’ 
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situation: a compound reacts or does not react. Its absence may destroy the global 
pattern, but it does not modulate or shift it in any specific way” ([64], p. 593). But to 
have distinct functions requires organizational differentiation, and “a self-maintaining 
system is organizationally differentiated if it produces different and localizable 
patterns or structures, each making a specific contribution to the conditions of 
existence of the whole organization” ([66], p. 826).  
 
We suggest that the spot-tail is an example of a dissipative structure that can satisfy 
these requirements. First, its self-motility is a behavior-based contribution to global 
self-maintenance under some conditions, thereby integrating the ‘tail’ into the 
system’s overall organizational closure [29]. Second, the ability of self-motility is 
generated by a distinct function, which is dependent on the contribution of a 
localizable structure, namely the ‘tail’ of the ‘spot’. Third, the ‘tail’ can be removed 
without destroying the original ‘spot’, thereby demonstrating that this is not simply an 
‘all or nothing’ situation. Instead, the spot-tail structure exhibits a kind of hierarchical 
decoupling of the tail from the main spot, because the latter can exist without the 
former but not vice versa. What this analysis shows is that the necessary requirements 
for the origin of life, as currently envisioned by these authors, are in fact realizable by 
more minimal systems than they expected.  
 
4.5 Development 
 
We conceive of the notion of development in a broad way so as to include any 
structural changes of the organism, which turn it into a qualitatively different kind of 
being in its own lifetime. These structural changes can include (ordered in roughly 
increasing temporal scale) growth, habituation, learning, and ontogeny. Not all forms 
of life exhibit all of these variations of development to the same extent, but all display 
some capacity for structural transformation.  
 
In a very minimal sense, development can already be seen in single spots. When they 
exhibit directional movement, they do so because of ongoing structural changes: they 
grow toward the increasing gradient, and decay away on the other side. They are like 
plants in that growth and behavior are not always readily separable. In addition, we 
find more complex lifetime structural changes. These changes typically proceed via 
the incorporation of external elements rather than via internally generated changes. 
For example, a spot can be turned into a spot-tail system by being ‘infected’ with a 
tail from a passing spot-tail system. During this encounter the chemical species of the 
other’s tail is incorporated into the functional organization of the spot. The emergence 
of a spot-tail system is therefore perhaps akin to a minimal prebiotic example of 
‘consortia’, i.e. a tight coupling between two or more different microorganisms that 
associate during growth to form characteristically ordered structures. Consortia has 
been mentioned in the context of the hydrothermal vent scenario of the origin of life, 
e.g. a syntrophic metabolic relationship between CH4-oxidizing archaea and sulphate-
reducing bacteria [57]. In addition to the emergence of a spot-tail system Virgo [107] 
observed a second, related kind of process in another reaction-diffusion system (with 
a different set of equations), whereby two nearby spots consisting of mutually 
complementary catalytic reactions join together to form a multi-spot system, thus 
forming a proper chemical hypercycle. Future work could consider whether there is 
the possibility of prebiotic endosymbiosis. 
 
	   21	  
4.6 Evolution 
 
We have already observed that there is a heritable difference between a spot with a 
tail and a spot without tail. Once a spot acquires a tail due to a lifetime event, there is 
a good possibility that this feature will be passed on to the next generation when the 
spot-tail multiplies through division (see Figure 4). This evolution by infection is not as 
odd as it may seem at first, because symbiogenesis has likely played a significant role 
in the evolution of modern cells as well [56]. However, this spot-tail system is still 
lacking a decoupled genetic system with which to encode such differences in a 
relatively metabolism-independent manner. In our analysis of the spots’ evolutionary 
capacity we therefore only focus on epigenetic evolution and on evolution by natural 
selection with a compositional genome. 
 
Epigenetic evolution. One of the main epigenetic factors of inheritance is the specific 
time-space configuration in which an individual is born. A famous case is the beaver's 
dam, which, once constructed, provides a home for subsequent generations. This kind 
of inheritance can also occur in the case of reaction-diffusion spots. For instance, the 
offspring of those spots, which happened to divide because of a high concentration of 
nutrients, will also find themselves in a situation with high concentration of nutrients. 
Of course, the situation is no different for other examples of protocells, which divide 
with sufficient nutrients. But the spots have an additional advantage in that they tend 
to seek out areas with conditions that are more favorable, a behavior which not only 
ensures more chances of replication but also a better start for their offspring. 
 
Composition-genomic evolution. The current chemical composition of spot can be 
considered as both its phenotype and genotype combined. The idea is that this kind of 
‘compositional genome’ could have enabled protocellular evolution by means of 
natural selection even in the absence of any specialized information-carrying 
component such as RNA and DNA [91]. For instance, spots with tails can be seen as 
undergoing a Lamarckian form of inheritance, whereby traits that have been acquired 
during an individual's lifetime are passed along to the offspring. Once a spot has 
acquired a tail (perhaps by passing near to another tailed spot), it will divide in a way 
that often, but not always, results in offspring that have tails. 
 
We also find a difference in selective pressure since in some environments the spots 
with tails are more viable than the single spots on their own (see Figure 5). This is 
because spot-tail systems move around even in the absence of chemical gradients, and 
they are thereby able to minimize the impact of localized catastrophic events. Greater 
spatial distribution lessens the risk of the population going extinct. In this scenario the 
original single-spot constituents may therefore die out eventually, while the spot-tail 
variant persists. Here we therefore have all the necessary elements of evolution by 
natural selection as it is standardly conceived, namely reproduction, variance, and 
selection, but with limited rather than ‘unlimited heredity’ [97]. A challenge for future 
work is to find a way in which such simple dissipative structures can regulate their 
self-production in a mediated manner, such that the generational transmission of the 
mediating structures itself can give rise to a more open-ended kind of heredity. 
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5. Discussion 
 
The model has served as a proof of concept that even simple reaction-diffusion spots 
can exhibit many essential life-like characteristics, where life is conceived as a unified 
process of being, doing, developing and evolving. We have focused on the importance 
of self-organized motility and behavior in the context of current debates on the origin 
of life. In this discussion we would like to draw attention to the shortcomings of the 
current model, and to consider possible ways of overcoming them.  
 
The spots satisfied the basic requirements of metabolism (self-creation) and behavior 
(self-motility). In fact, they are even capable of adaptive behavior that resembles the 
foraging behavior of actual bacteria (nutrient gradient following). The spots are also 
capable of some proto-development through the incorporation of additional external 
elements, and these lifetime changes are inheritable over generations. Taken together 
these findings suggest that the spots meet the criteria of undergoing changes within 
the four major timescales that are characteristic of life, namely metabolism, behavior, 
development, and evolution.  
 
But are these spots really a model of the phenomenon of life? Life is not only 
expressed across those four major timescales, it is expressed in a characteristically 
open-ended manner of becoming [31]. No matter what timescale, life is always ready 
to surprise us. And it is precisely with regard to this capacity for open-endedness that 
the limitations of the current model are apparent. How far can the reaction-diffusion 
approach be scaled up? Is it possible to set up the environmental conditions such that 
a more complex network of dissipative structures emerges? Would this network be 
capable of new useful behaviors? By which mechanism could such a network learn to 
improve its behaviors? How could it reproduce itself reliably? And by which kinds of 
methods could we observe such a complex chemical system? 
 
An important issue in sorting out these questions is the problem of mediation. At the 
moment these structures are only capable of what has been called “metabolism-based” 
behaviors [19]. Although the spot-tail system exhibited a minimal form of hierarchical 
decoupling, more complex behaviors require a more systematic mediation between 
the constitutive (metabolic) and interactive (behavioral) domains. Indeed, the whole 
history of life on earth can be interpreted as the evolution of increasingly complex 
forms of mediation that enabled the emergence of new forms of autonomy [44]. 
 
A related issue that still needs to be tackled in future models of this kind is how to 
introduce the possibility of solid structures. In the current model the spots are fully 
transparent to environmental interactions, although chemical gradients may constitute 
some boundaries. This extreme chemical transparency effectively turns the whole spot 
into an interface with its environment. In order to enable a more open-ended increase 
in complexity, it may eventually become necessary for these systems to localize their 
interfaces at their spatial boundaries. In other words, one important form of mediation 
is a sensorimotor surface. In addition, internal differentiation between the constitutive 
elements that are responsible for self-creation and those that are needed for regulating 
interaction leads to increased behavioral autonomy [5]. This differentiation may also 
enable further specialization of these elements for their respective tasks, since they no 
longer need to do both tasks at the same time.  
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Given the continuing dispute about the nature and role of the genetic system in the 
information-compartment-metabolism-first consensus, it is of interest to determine to 
what extent a representational genetic code is in fact necessary for the phenomenon of 
life, as we have characterized it. One practical way to address this issue, which we 
have pursued in this paper, is to determine how life-like a dissipative structure can be 
(and become) without having any dedicated genetic code that could map between a 
genotype and a phenotype. But if we do not assume that such a representational code 
already existed at the origin of life, then we are faced with the problem of how a 
distinct genotype could have arisen during the history of life.  
 
We speculate that the genetic system may have originally had a function on the level 
of intermediate timescales of behavior and development. Clearly, in order for the 
genetic system to be retained and selected on the generational timescale of evolution, 
it must have already had a useful lifetime function. For instance, it could have started 
as a way of mediating processes of self-construction, which would have facilitated the 
adaptive regulation of behavior and developmental reorganization of metabolic and 
interactive pathways. It could also have served as a way facilitating the learning and 
memory capacities of the individuals. Given that these complex functions must have 
already been heritable if they were originated (or at least optimized) by evolution via 
natural selection, then their potential for exaptation in the service of a dedicated 
genotype may have been co-selected from the start.  
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